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I. INTRODUCTION
Following the 1986 Tax Reform Act in the United States, the tax systems
of most industrial countries are undergoing, or have already carried out,
significant changes. The countries where major reforms are being or
have been enacted are Australia, Japan, Denmark, and New Zealand.
Less drastic reforms are being or have been enacted in France, Germany,
Italy, Belgium, Sweden, Norway, the Netherlands, and a few others.
On the basis of a worldwide study, Pechman (1987) concludes that these
countries have been "impressed by the success of tax reform in the
United States, particularly the reduction in the top income tax rate"
(p. 1). More important, perhaps, is the widespread discontent with
existing tax systems, which are seen to cause serious inequities and
misallocations.
In both the individual and the corporate income tax, the predominant
principles in these tax reforms were a reduction of the statutory rates
and a broadening of the taxable base. In terms of the overall tax burden,26 Sheshinski
these principles work in opposite directions. Although all these reforms
were supposed to be "revenue neutral," i.e., to make tax revenues no
greater or lower, they clearly have equity and efficiency effects which
should be examined. While the schedular changes and base broadening
with regard to labor earnings have been fairly widely documented (see,
for example, Pechman, 1987, and Tanzi, 1987) the changes with regard
to the taxation of capital income—interest, dividends and capital
gains—have been less clear. One reason is the complexity of the laws,
even after tax reform, pertaining to corporate income, withholding at
source, and short- and long-term capital gains. Another reason is the
need to distinguish between nominal and real tax rates. Tax systems
which include nominal interest income and allow deductions of nominal
interest expenses in the taxable base are not neutral with respect to price
changes. That is, effective real tax rates vary with the rate of inflation. In
the absence of indexation, the same applies to capital gains. All indus-
trial countries have experienced in recent years a decline in the rate of
inflation. A major objective of this paper is to evaluate the impact of
these combined changes—reduction in tax rates coupled with elimina-
tion of many tax expenditures and a decline in the rate of inflation—on
the cost of capital.
II. THE U.S. TAX REFORM
It would not be possible in this paper to give details of the 1986 Tax
Reform Act, but the essential elements can be listed:
1. Personal exemptions and standard deductions have been doubled,
thereby removing five million people, officially defined as "poor,"
from the tax rolls. The principle that the poor should not be taxed,
as well as the distribution of the tax burden, will be maintained by
the automatic adjustment of brackets and personal exemptions to
inflation;
2. Increases in the earned income credit for wage earners with families
eliminated almost the entire social security tax for those eligible for
full credit and decreased the tax burden for low income earners.
3. The new rate structure has four brackets, with rates of 15, 28, 33 and
28 percent, replacing the earlier 14 rates which rose to a maximum of
50 percent. The 33 percent bracket reflects the phasing out, at a 5
percent rate, of the benefits of the lowest tax rate and the personal
exemptions.
4. Capital gains are taxed as ordinary income, reflecting the adoption ofTreatment of Capital Income 27
the "comprehensive income" concept for tax purposes. The absence
of indexation of nominal capital gains on the one hand, and the
continued exemption of accrued capital gains on assets transferred by
gift or at death on the other, affect the real burden and the economic
impact of the tax in opposite directions.
5. Broad elimination of major loopholes, tax shelters, and special bene-
fits. For example, unemployment benefits which were previously
taxable only if a married taxpayer's annual income exceeded $18,000
($12,000 for singles) were made taxable regardless of size. Deductions
for state and local sales taxes and consumer interest were eliminated.
Deductions for unreimbursed business expenses and other miscel-
laneous expenses were allowed only to the extent that they exceed
two percent of income.
6. A limitation was imposed on the deductibility of losses from passive
investments, thereby eliminating many tax shelters. The deduction of
interest expenses for investment was limited to the amount of invest-
ment income. Minimum tax floors for individuals and businesses
were strengthened.
7. The corporate income tax rate was reduced from 46 to 34 percent. The
tax on dividends was thereby cut from a maximum of 73 to 52.5
percent. On the other hand, elimination of the investment tax credit
and the reduction in depreciation allowances (for structures) has
broadened the corporate taxable base. The overall outcome is an in-
crease of 20 percent in corporate tax liabilities.
The distributional impact of all these changes has been estimated by
Pechman (1989) to be highly progressive.
III. TAX REFORMS IN OTHER COUNTRIES
A large number of industrial countries have followed the United States
and have enacted, or are in the process of adopting, major tax reforms.
Although the extent and details vary across countries, some common
trends can be observed.
1. Reduction in individual tax rates, particularly in the top brackets,
and a compression in the number of brackets. Table 1 shows that be-
tween 1985 and 1987 the top marginal tax rate was reduced on average
from 66 to 56 percent, i.e., a reduction of 16 percent. Leading the list is
New Zealand (26 points and scheduled to decline 8 additional points by
1993!), Japan (23 points), as compared with a 22 point reduction in the
United States, 10 points in the United Kingdom and 11 points in Au-28 Sheshinski
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Source: Pechman (1987, p. 4), supplemented by Pechman (1989) and Vito Tanzi (1987).
a Combined national and local tax rates.
b Takes into account the deductibility of local tax when calculating national tax.
c Includes federal and provincial surtaxes (and the Ontario provincial tax rate).
d Assumes local tax rate of 30 percent.
stralia. However, no country has gone as far as the United States in
terms of the level of the top marginal tax rate. Futhermore, the relative
spread between the top marginal rates across countries has somewhat
increased (the coefficient of variation is 0.16 in 1985 and 0.21 in 1989).
Further attempts toward rate uniformity are expected to take place in the
Common Market and elsewhere after 1992. The persistence of these tax
differentials may provide an inducement for highly skilled labor migra-
tion from high to low tax countries. Although the percentage of individ-
uals at the highest rate may be small,
1 such a "brain drain" may have a
significant impact.
2. Tax treatment of income from capital varies significantly across
countries. As seen in Table 2, only Germany and the Netherlands tax
interest income at the same rate as earnings. In the United Kingdom and
1 Tanzi (1987) provides OECD data pertaining to 1981, showing that the top tax rate
applies to less than 1 percent of taxpayers, but the percentage of tax yields from these
taxpayers was between 4-8 percent of total tax revenues. The widening of the brackets
after tax reforms has undoubtedly increased the numbers of the taxpayers at the top rate.G S3 C





















in Denmark the top marginal tax rate on interest is 40 percent, while on
wage earnings it is 50 percent. In France and in Italy interest income is
taxed at its source, at flat rates of 26 percent and 12.5 percent, respec-
tively. The proposed tax reform in Japan also taxes interest income at a
uniform 20 percent rate. This tendency to tax financial income at lower,
and sometimes uniform, rates is less pronounced when it comes to
dividends. As a rule, long-term capital gains are not taxed, or taxed at a
significantly lower marginal tax rate (France and the United Kingdom).
There is a striking difference between these countries and the United
States. While the 1986 Tax Reform Act in the United States has moved
towards a comprehensive income concept in taxing equally all sources of
income, there is no discernible trend in this direction among the Euro-
pean countries.
Tanzi (1987) notes that "while there is a lot of similarity in the way
countries tax interest incomes, there are wide differences in the way
they have been treating interest expenses." His data indicate that Den-
mark, Finland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and
the United States were by far the most generous in allowing wide deduc-
tibility for interest expenses. On the other hand, Canada, France, Ger-
many, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and some other countries were
far less generous.
The recent tax reforms have, however, reduced the differences among
these countries. For example, before 1986, the United States fully taxed
nominal interest incomes of individuals and allowed unlimited deducti-
bility for all interest payments. Japan, on the other hand, exempted
interest income and limited interest deductions (for example, for a sec-
ond residence and on consumer loans. Even the deduction for principal
residence mortgage had a low ceiling.) As already noted, the 1986 Tax
Reform Act in the United States is phasing out the deducibility of inter-
est expenses, while in Japan a 1987 law extended mortgage deductions
in the middle income range; their tax reform in 1988 includes a 20 per-
cent tax on interest income.
3. Corporate tax rates in other countries are also declining, but less
drastically than the tax rates on individuals. The average corporate tax
rate has declined from 49 percent in 1985 to 43 percent in 1989. New
Zealand has the lowest rate (28 percent), the United Kingdom and the
Netherlands second (35 percent) and the United States, Australia, and
France are third (39 percent). Japan plans a further reduction (to 40
percent) in 1990, and Sweden (to 40 percent) in 1991.
There also seems to be a great deal of uniformity in the European
corporate tax systems regarding allowance for depreciation and loss

















































Source: International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation, OECD, Paris, Price Waterhouse.
a Declining balance method with a 25 percent rate.
generous in allowing faster depreciation rates and carryover losses both
backward and forward.
2
In reducing investment tax incentives, the United Kingdom led the
way in 1984 by eliminating expensing for plant and equipment, using
the tax revenues to reduce the corporate rate from 50 to 40 and then 35
percent. The United States and Canada have also eliminated the invest-
ment tax credit and reduced the corporate tax rate. Australia has tem-
porarily increased its corporate tax rate but this should be partially offset
by relief for dividends received by stockholders. The countries with high
corporate tax rates—Germany, Japan, Sweden, and Denmark—may
have to reduce their rates to be competitive in international markets.
The combined effect of base-broadening and rate reduction has been
on average to keep corporate tax revenues intact, i.e., revenue neutral
(Table 4).
4. There are major differences between countries with respect to capi-
tal gains taxation of traded stocks. Only the United States and Australia
regard capital gains as ordinary income, i.e., tax these gains at the same
rate as earnings. All other countries either fully exempt or tax at ex-
tremely favorable rates long-term gains (i.e., gains on stocks held longer
than a year, or, in Sweden, longer than two years) (Table 5). Pechman
(1989) thinks that "this attitude reflects the long standing European view
that capital gains are not income." These countries also doubt the possi-
2 After 1986, the depreciation method for equipment is the declining balance (at 200 per-
cent) or straight line, whichever provides the maximum deduction, and declining balance
(at 150 percent) on structures.32 Sheshinski
TABLE 4
Corporate Income Tax Rates and Tax Revenues As Percent



































































































Source: Corporate Tax Rates: Pechman (1987, p. 5), supplemented in Pechman (1989); Corporate Tax
Revenues: OECD, Committee on Fiscal Affairs, DAFFFE/CFA/89.14.
a Combined national and local tax rates.
b Tax rate for non-manufacturing corporation. Tax for a manufacturing corporation is lower.
c Tax on undistributed profits only. Tax on distributed profits taxed at lower rate in Germany and Japan
and at a higher rate in France (beginning in 1989).
d Takes into account the deducibility of local tax from national tax.
bility of restricting the deduction for net capital losses, as imposed by
the United States ($3,000 annually).
Except Australia, no country that taxes capital gains has adopted in-
dexation of the buying value.
IV. INTEREST INCOME TAXATION,
INFLATION, AND THE REAL
COST OF CAPITAL
The major factors in the tax system that distort the lending-borrowing
decisions are its treatment of interest income and the deducibility of
interest expenses. In the presence of inflation, it is particularly impor-
tant whether the tax system distinguishes between nominal and real in-Treatment of Capital Income 33
TABLE 5





















































































Source: C. Walker and M. Bloomfield, "The Case for the Restoration of a Capital Gains Tax Differen-
tial," Tax Notes, May 22, 1989, p. 1021.
a State, provincial, and local taxes are not included. They can in some cases be substantial. Further-
more, in some countries exclusion rules might apply.
b The nominal tax rate for long- and short-term capital gains is 28 percent. The marginal rate, however,
rises to 33 percent for joint returns between $74,850 and $155,370 and for single returns between
$44,900 and $93,130 for calendar year 1989.
c Indexing is allowed on long-term capital gains.
d Canadian residents are allowed an annual capital gains exemption of Can $30,000 subject to a cumula-
tive exemption of up to Can$500,000. In 1990, the lifetime capital gains exemption is reduced to
$100,000, except for owner/operators of farms and small business corporations who may continue to
apply the $500,000 limit.
e Gains from proceeds of up to F 272,000 are exempt from taxation in a given taxable year.
1 The first DM 1,000 of short-term capital gains is exempt from tax.
8 Japan's tax reform plan, which took effect in 1989, imposes a maximum tax of approximately 5 percent
on the sale of securities.
h Only gains and losses accrued since 1982 may still be taxed; gains since 1982 are indexed.
terest. In the absence of taxes on interest, the nominal rate of interest
has to increase by the rate of inflation in order to keep the real rate of
interest unchanged. When nominal interest incomes are taxed and nom-
inal interest payments are deductible expenses, the increase in the nomi-
nal rate of interest, r, is related to the real rate of interest, r*, to the rate
of inflation, II, and to the rate of interest taxation, t, by the well-known
formula:
r = r* + n
I - t
(i)34 Sheshinski
The rate r is sometimes called the "required" rate of interest (Tanzi,
1987).
As seen in Table 6, the rate of inflation in the 1980s has decreased in all
industrial countries. While the average rate of inflation has been 12.5
percent in 1980, it came down to 3.5 percent in 1987. As we have seen,
tax rates also decreased during the same period. Both of these factors
worked to reduce the required rates of interest. It is interesting to in-
quire whether these rates have conformed with formula (1), keeping the
real rates of interest invariant.
In Table 7 we have calculated the "required" interest rates in different
countries during 1980-1989, using the data on rates of inflation (Table 6)
and on tax rates (Table 1); under the assumption that the real rate of
interest is 4 percent. As expected, the average of the "required" rates
declined significantly during this period, from 22.2 percent in 1985 to
12.8 percent in 1989, i.e., a decline of 9 percent. The bulk of this decline
(about 70 percent) is due to the decrease in inflation rates, the rest is due
to the reduction in tax rates.
Did the actual interest rates change to the same extent as the "re-
quired" rates? If changes in the actual rates of interest were less or more
accentuated than those in the required rates, this implies that the real
rates facing lenders and borrowers were not invariant.
TABLE 6
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Table 7 also provides data on deposit and lending interest rates during
1985-1988. As expected, these rates declined significantly (average lend-
ing rates, for example, went down from 12.9 percent in 1985 to 10.7
percent in 1988), but not to the same extent as the required rates. In fact,
a linear regression of the required rates, r, on lending rates, r\, yields
r = -2.17 + 1.43 n {R
2 = 0.52) (2)
(1.85) (0.25)
A coefficient of 1.43 (highly significant with 32 observations) and
insignificant intercepts imply that actual interest rates adjust only par-
tially (about 0.7 of a percentage point for each 1 percentage point) to
changes in the required rates. This means that the decline in the tax rates
and in the rate of inflation had a real effect toward reducing real interest
rates.
A direct way to measure the effect of the tax on interest income is to
calculate the effective real marginal tax rate for recipients of interest
income:
r t effective real marginal tax rate = * (3)
where t was taken as the top individual marginal tax rate. These calcula-
tions are presented in Table 8. In 1989, the United States had the lowest
real tax rate, while in 1985, Germany had the lowest rate. It should be
emphasized that these are the tax rates that would apply if interest
income was taxed as ordinary income, as is the case in the United States.
Japan, for example, did not tax interest income until 1989 and will now
tax it at a flat 20 percent rate.
More significant, presumably, is a comparison of the real rates faced
by borrowers who can deduct nominal interest expenses. A major rea-
son for the attention in recent years to the tax treatment of interest
expenses has been the combination of high inflation rates and the un-
limited deducibility of nominal interest expenses. As Tanzi (1987)
notes, after-tax interest rates were negative for many taxpayers, creating
an inducement for consumption and low savings. He notes that in Den-
mark, for instance, in 1985 interest deductions by individuals were 16
percent of personal income. For many individuals these deductions
could be taken against marginal tax rates of 73 percent.
As a result, Denmark now limits the tax rate against which interest
deductions are allowed to 50 percent. Similar negative effects of interest
deductions were felt in the other Scandinavian countries and reforms
were undertaken reducing the advantages of borrowing. Dividing coun-Treatment of Capital Income 37
TABLE 8
Real Interest Rates, Effective Real Marginal Tax Rates on Interest










































































































c Lending Rate (1 - Marginal Tax Rate) - Inflation Rate
tries into those with the most generous treatment and those with the
least generous treatment of interest deductions, Tanzi (1987) finds that
household savings out of disposable income has been significantly lower
in the former group (an average of 4 percent vs. 9 percent in 1985).
Table 8 indicates that the decrease in the rates of inflation and the
reduction in marginal tax rates has increased the average real borrowing
rate of interest from -0.5 percent in 1985 to 1.5 percent in 1987. The
United States rate in 1987 was higher than in Japan (1.7) and the United
Kingdom (0.1) but lower than in France (3.5) and Germany (3.3).
V. EVALUATING THE EFFICIENCY GAINS
FROM LOWER TAXES ON CAPITAL INCOME
The previous discussion has demonstrated that in most countries, capi-
tal income is taxed at preferentially low rates. While in the United States
the equalization of tax rates on ordinary income and capital gains has
been a keystone of the tax reform, no such tendency is evident in other
countries. This, and the recent debate in the United States on rolling38 Sheshinski
back capital gains taxation to a maximum of 15 percent, raised the natu-
ral question of whether such differential tax rates are efficient.
Economists have long been aware that, from an efficiency point of
view, comprehensive income taxation will be the exception rather than
the rule. Models that attempt to determine the optimal structure of in-
come tax rates on earnings and on income from capital, depending on
labor supply and on savings elasticities, rarely give rise to equal tax
rates. Actually, some of the most commonly used models justify no
taxation of capital income, i.e., taxation of earnings and an exemption
for capital income (see, for example, Sheshinksi, 1989, and the refer-
ences therein). Even in these circumstances, however, equity considera-
tions may induce some taxation of capital. While a detailed analysis of
this issue is clearly beyond the objectives of this paper, it seems worth-
while to provide some evaluation of the welfare gains obtained in mov-
ing to lower tax rates on capital income.
Feldstein (1978) has shown that the gains of a shift from equal tax rates
on capital and labor to an income tax imposed only on labor earnings
(keeping tax revenues intact) are equal between 2 and 2.5 percent of total
labor income in the United States. This is a major efficiency gain.
We have adopted the elasticities assumed by Feldstein: labor supply
wage elasticity of .3 and a savings elasticity with respect to the interest
rate of .07, and have shown (Appendix) that the efficiency gains are
somewhat about 1.2 percent of total labor income—and, more impor-
tant, that 80 percent of this welfare gain is obtained by reducing the
capital income tax to half the rate of the tax on earnings. Thus, while a
departure from comprehensive income taxation toward lower taxation
of capital income may lead to substantial welfare gains, most of these
gains are obtained before a 2:1 ratio of labor to capital income rates are
attained, and welfare is quite insensitive to further reductions in capital
taxation (accompanied by an increase in labor taxation).
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper has surveyed the major trends in tax reforms in industrial
countries, particularly in relation to the taxation of income from capi-
tal—interest, dividends, and capital gains. It has been demonstrated
that, while reforms concerning the tax treatment of earnings have a
common tendency to reduce marginal rates, particularly the top rates,
coupled with a broadening of the tax base ("leveling the playing field"),
no such tendency is observed with regard to the taxation of income from
capital. No other country has adopted the comprehensive income con-
cept, which underlies the United States' 1986 Tax Reform Act. WithoutTreatment of Capital Income 39
exception, interest income and, to a lesser extent, dividends are taxed at
favorably low rates (including zero) and long-term capital gains are, as a
rule, exempt.
All tax systems have avoided indexing capital income to changes in
the price level. As a consequence, the presence of high and variable
inflation rates has been a major source of distortion in the capital mar-
kets. In spite of reductions in marginal tax rates, net rates of return to
lenders have been negatively affected by inflation, i.e., actual nominal
rates have not fully compensated for inflation and lagged behind the
rates "required" to preserve the real rates. The nominal basis has also
been the major factor that prevented a convergence of effective real tax
rates across countries.
Faced with negative or very low real interest rates for borrowers,
many countries attempt to curb the negative effect on household savings
by imposing limits on interest deductibility.
The Scandinavian practice of taxing net capital income at the lowest
marginal rates in the individual income tax schedule is similar in spirit to
the proposed flat tax rate (20 percent) on interest income proposed in
Japan and Israel.
Adjustments of interest and capital gains for inflation and the use of
real economic depreciation seem to be the best method to eliminate most
of the tax benefits of tax shelters. Furthermore, indexation is a nec-
essary condition for further harmonization of tax rates in different
countries.
APPENDIX
We wish to analyze the welfare cost of capital income taxation relative to
labor income. Following Feldstein (1978) and Green and Sheshinsky
(1979), consider a two-period model, in which labor supply in the first
period is variable and the individual's second-period consumption is the
after-tax value of his savings. Two tax rates are to be selected: a tax on
labor earnings and a tax on interest income. Individuals are assumed to
maximize
U{clfc2,l ~ L) = a log d + 3 log c2 + 7 log (1 - L) (A.I)
subject to
ci + Y^-T -wL = 0 (A.2)40 Sheshinski
where C\ = first-period consumption; c2 = second-period (retirement)
consumption; 1 — L = leisure in the first period; r = net (after-tax)
interest rate; w = net (after-tax) wage rate, in units of C\. The non-
negative constants a, (3 and y can be chosen, without loss of generality,
to satisfy a + p + 7 = 1. The expenditure function, E, associated with
(A.I) is
E(w,r,u) = A{1 + r)~^w
ye
u - w (A.3)
where A = a~
ap~
P7~
7. Compensated demands are given by the partial
derivatives of E w.r.t. prices. The price of second-period consumption is
1/(1 + r) and the price of leisure is w. Thus,
c2 =
1 - L = yA(l + ry^vf-
xe
u (A.4)
where C\ is obtained from the identity E = C\ + -z—^— - wh.
There are two (ad valorem) taxes: an earnings tax at the rate T, and a
capital income tax at a rate t. Thus, net returns are related to gross
returns f and w by
r = f(l - 0
(A.5)
w = w(l - T).
The present value of tax receipts, T, evaluated at the pre-tax rate of
interest is given by
T = wrL + -^-j S (A.6)
where savings, S, are
S = wL - cx. (A.7)
Minimizing (A.3) w.rA. t and T, subject to (A.6) yields a result which, I
believe, is well-known: The optimum tax rates T* and t* satisfy t* = 0 andTreatment of Capital Income 41
T* > 0, i.e. capital income is not taxed. The reason for this outcome in the
(logarithmic) model is due (in terms of the Corlett-Hague-Ramsey for-
mulas) to the equality of the cross (compensated) elasticities of con-
sumption in the two periods with leisure. This is equivalent to taxing
labor income (subsidizing leisure) alone. Although this result is confined
to the logarithmic utility case, it provides a strong prima facie case against
capital income taxation. Now let us consider the welfare loss due to de-
viations from the efficient solution.
Suppose, initially, that a comprehensive income tax is in effect (as in
the 1986 U.S. tax reform). Let the initial tax rates on labor and capital
income be equal at 40 percent: t = T = .4. The following parameter
values correspond to Feldstein (1978):
a = .63
p = .07 (A.8)
7 = .30
These imply a savings rate of 10 percent out of earnings and a mar-
ginal propensity to spend on leisure of .3. With a 25-year savings hori-
zon and a pre-tax interest rate of 12 percent per annum, f = 17. With
these parameters, we calculated from (A.6), that T = .4924. To keep tax
revenues intact, an elimination of the tax on capital income requires
raising the tax rate on labor earnings to T = .4205.
The dead-weight loss of the tax system, L, is defined by
L(t,r,u) = E(w,r,u) - E(zZ>,f,u) - T{w,r,u). (A.9)
We can now calculate the gain in the dead-weight loss due to the
elimination of the capital income tax, AL, keeping tax revenues intact:
AL = L(t - T - A,u) - L(t - 0, T - .4205, u) = .008535. (A.10)
That is, the tax system without capital income taxation induces a gain of
1.22 percent of initial labor income (wL = .7), or about $18 billion in the
U.S. economy. This is 1.73 percent of the present value of tax revenue, a
significant efficiency gain. However, it turns out that most of the welfare
gain is obtained by reducing the capital income tax to 20 percent and a
relatively flat welfare function below this level. In fact, 80 percent of the
welfare gain could be realized by this reduction. So, when equity consid-
erations are incorporated, it seems reasonable to argue that a 2:1 ratio of42 Sheshinski
labor to capital income taxes strikes an optimal balance between effi-
ciency and equity considerations.
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